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Choosing sides in the dilemma of realism versus utopia of the concept of quality in 
legislation is not a simple matter. The practice of drafting legislation extends to a wealth of 
experience spreading over thousands of years in time, hundreds of countries in geographical 
space, and hundreds of legal systems of all known families of laws. Yet this richness of 
tradition, this repeated Tantalian trial and error over many years and through all known 
ideologies, philosophies, cultures, and laws has, in practice, failed to yield wisdom on quality 
of legislation. What is it that makes a law “good”? What elements can be duplicated in order 
to recreate, again and again, on request, laws that prescribe by an accepted threshold of 
quality?  
 When trying to identify the elements of good laws, one may resort to the many widely 
accepted rules and conventions of drafting. These are included in lists, albeit non exhaustive, 
of models available to drafters in the form of manuals. It would be feasible for a group of 
experts to collect as many rules and conventions as possible, dig out those that are common 
across borders, and declare them as models for quality in legislation. But, although one can 
indeed identify a great number of manuals in legislative drafting, and identify commonly 
shared rules and conventions, these rules cannot be baptised elements of quality. Judged 
against the results that they have yielded in their rich past, these manuals can only be viewed 
as compilations of good practice that may, when everything else is right, lead to the 
production of good law. In other words, most manuals repeat the same basic principles, they 
offer similar examples of bad practices and best practices, but at the end of the day legislation 
produced on their basis continues to fail to always reach high standards even when all these 
conventions are adhered to.   
But, if non application of the common wisdom of drafters and law makers is not to 
blame for bad laws, at least not exclusively, then what is the problem? Could it be that the 
nature of these rules is such, that their unfailing application does not guarantee quality in 
legislation? In other words, could it be that drafting rules and conventions differ from natural 
laws? That they are not appropriate for blind application, without exception? And that 
therefore the list of rules and conventions that we hold sacred in our drafting manuals are 
inappropriate as elements of quality in legislation? 
 The hypothesis of this paper is that a functional definition of quality of legislation 
renders it a realistic, and indeed universally applicable, concept within phronetic
1
 legislative 
drafting.  In other words, within the realm of legislative drafting as phronesis, rules and 
conventions only serve as a selection of tools which can be chosen by the subjective learned 
drafter in order to produce good laws. Since the rules and conventions of phronetic legislative 
drafting cannot possibly be applied with the rigidity and teleogenesis or inexorableness of 
rules of epistemic disciplines, promoting them to elements sine qua non of the concept of 
quality in legislation is an unfortunate logical faux pas. Elements of a concept cannot 
possibly carry such a degree of flexibility and subjectivity that their semantic field lacks 
stability of meaning. And even faithful duplication of the application of such rules can never 
lead to certainty in the quality of the resulting law. In phronetic legislative drafting repetition 
of application of the same rule can produce, by definition, variable results.
2
 First, the 
subjectivity of the recreation of the application by the drafter entails variable success in the 
identification of the precise same set of circumstances as the original environment. And this 
weakness can be viewed either as possible or, perhaps rightly so, as inherent in the task of 
drafting legislation: can the legal and legislative environment ever be the same? Second, the 
alleged repetition of the application of the same rule entails variable success in the subjective 
judgement of the appropriateness of the rule per se, but also of its promotion as the best, 
amongst other more or less suitable, tool. In phronetic legislative drafting the process of 
drafting via the repeated application of the same rule or convention carries no guarantees of 
duplication of results. Since the legislative environment is by definition fluid, dynamic, and 
complex, the lab within which the legislative experiment takes place cannot remain 
identically the same. Moreover, since the correlation of rules and conventions at any given 
time is unstable, even within the same moment in time and at the same space, the 
mathematical formula promoted by the subjective researcher cannot remain identical to the 
original one. But if the lab environment changes, and the formula is variable, how can one 
possibly expect predictable results?  
 The placement of rules and drafting conventions within a realm of phonetic legislative 
science reveals their subjectivity and an unfortunate dependence on a myriad of variable 
external factors. In fact, placing them within a phronetic approach to legislative drafting 
deprives rules and conventions from credibility as elements of quality. Rules and conventions 
simply fail to serve as lists of practices that will predictably result to good laws. And thus, 
these rules and conventions cannot be considered as conditia sine qua non of what is a good 
law. 
The nature of legislative drafting   
But is drafting really phronetic? Is this classification of legislative drafting as phronetic a 
plausible alternative to the art versus science pseudo-dilemma?  
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 For Aristotle
3
 all human intellectuality can be classified as
4
 science as episteme; art 
as techne; or phronesis
5
 as the praxis of subjective decision making on factual circumstances 
or the practical wisdom of the subjective classification of factual circumstances to principals 
and wisdom as episteme.
6
  
Science carries with it universality,
7
 teleogenesis, and predictability: if a heavy object 
is to be dropped from the top floor of a tall building, it will definitely head down. If drafting 
were to be viewed as a science in its positivist sense, then the correct application of a widely 
agreeable list of drafting rules and wisdoms would definitely lead to repeated quality in the 
end result. But drafting is not a science,
8
 and its rules are simply not rigid. In fact, rules of 
law may well be universal but they do not apply with infallibility. “All law is universal but 
about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which will be correct... the 
error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing”.9  Using the term 
“shall” may be an abomination for those of us who avoid ambiguity, but it would be rather 
misguided to reject the use of the term rigidly: it may well be that “shall”, ambiguous as it is, 
would be understood better, and therefore be more effective, in amendments of archaic laws 
where the term is used repeatedly to signify “must”; here, using the term “must” in 
conjunction with the existing “shall” would create the legitimate impression to the user that 
the meaning of “shall” and “must” is somewhat different.  
But accepting that drafting cannot be regulated by rigid inexorable rules cannot be 
taken to the extreme of seeing drafting as an art. Art is know-how associated with practicing 
an art.
10
 Art tends to lack any sense of rules. In the pursuit of aesthetic pleasure, art uses 
whatever tools are available. Art is anarchic. But drafting is not. Of course its rules are not 
rigid, but they are present. General principles form a theoretical background against which 
legislative drafting develops
11
: theories or principles in drafting carry a degree of relative 
predictability since the latter is one of the six elements of theory.
12
 
So, the debate between drafting as art
13
 or a quasi craft
14





 seems to be false. It ignores relativity as the essence of legal science. Law, and 
consequently drafting as its discipline, is not part of the arts, nor is it part of the sciences
17
 in 
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the positivist sense.
18
 Law and consequently drafting is neither episteme nor techne. It is 
phronesis, an arty science, with principles and rules that may well apply, but only in 
principle. It goes beyond analytical scientific knowledge (episteme) and know-how (techne). 
and it involves judgements and decisions made “in the manner of a virtuoso social 
actor”.19Virtuosos do not apply rules: they act on the basis of a holistic understanding of nets 
of rules that require proficiency.
20
 This is undertaken within the realm of Wintegen’s 
legisprudence as a theory of law.
21
 In other words, law, and consequently drafting, is a liberal 
discipline where theoretical principles guide the drafter to conscious decisions made in a 
series of subjective empirical and concrete choices. Drafting as phronesis is “akin to practical 
wisdom that comes from an intimate familiarity with contingencies and uncertainties of 
various forms of social practice embedded in complex social settings”.22 In other words, the 
art of drafting lies with the subjective use and application of its science, with the conscious 
subjective Aristotelian application and implementation of its universal theoretical principles 
to the concrete circumstances of the problem.
23
  
Law as phronesis encourages continued uniform application, and thus supports 
certainty and the rule of law in the civil law tradition. Law as phronesis supports prudence or 
appropriateness, and hence stare decisis, in the common law tradition. Phronesis can serve as 
a concrete guide to anyone wishing to ameliorate justice by urging the subject to answer the 
following questions: where are we heading to? Who wins and who loses, and by virtue of 
what mechanisms? What are desirable consequences? What can be done on this topic?
24
 
Phronesis supports probabilistic reasoning, as opposed to deductive reasoning, which can be 
defined as the selection of solutions made on the basis of informed yet subjective application 
of principles on set circumstances.
25
 Phronesis is “practical wisdom that responds to nuance 
and a sense of the concrete, outstripping abstract or general theories of what is right. In this 
way, practical wisdom relies on a kind of immediate insight, rather than more formal 
inferential processes”.26   
Being aware of these principles, the drafter has to decide in a conscious and informed 
manner, how to apply them to the concrete future choices
27
 that form part of their trade. And 
this can only be done if the drafter is aware of the theoretical principles that need to be 
applied, and of their hierarchy in the pyramid of principles.
28
  
Drafters pursue the following pyramid of virtues:
29
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Take for example, the notorious question of limits in the extreme use of plain language: do 
we need to substitute the term “mens rea” in modern English in rules of criminal procedure or 
criminal evidence? If one refers to the hierarchy of principles in drafting, then plain language 
is clearly a tool for clarity: thus, since the term “mens rea” is clear to lawyers and judges as 
the main users of rules of criminal evidence or criminal procedure, plain language bows 
down to clarity, and there is no need for a substitution of the term with its plain language 
equivalent. Moreover, the introduction of a new term may distort clarity and hence     
effectiveness of the new legislation. Another example of another notorious question: what 
happens in the event of a clash between clarity and precision? Simply, in application of the 
pyramid, the criterion of choice is effectiveness: since clarity and precision are in the same 
grade of the pyramid, the drafter will need to select whichever one of these two principles 
serves effectiveness best.  
Phronetic legislative drafting does not ignore the elements of art and science identified within 






            Clarity 
                Precision 
                  Ambiguity 
                               Simplicity/plain language 
                               Gender neutral language 
appropriate virtue to be applied by the drafter in cases of clash between equal virtues. But subjectivity 
is not anarchic: it is qualified by means of recognising effectiveness as the sole overriding criterion 
for that choice. 
What is quality in legislation? 
If the current lists of drafting rules and conventions cannot adequately serve as elements of 
quality in legislation, how can one define the concept of quality? It has now become obvious 
that this is not a matter of agreeing or disagreeing in the components of an empirical or 
technical definition. If the fault lies with the subjective and inexorable nature of drafting 
rules, then we need to review our approach to quality by seeking its definition on a non 
technical, non empirical nature.  
In a search for a qualitative definition of quality in legislation, one can resort to 
functionality. If legislation is a mere tool for regulation, and indeed a tool only to be used if 
everything else will fail,
30
 then a good law is simply a law that, if it enjoys support and 
cooperation from all actors in the legislative process,
31
 is able of producing the regulatory 
results required by policy makers. In other words, a good law is simply a law that is capable 
of achieving the regulatory reform that it was released to effectuate or support.
32
 A good law 
is one that is capable of leading to efficacy of regulation.  There is nothing technical at this 
level of qualitative functionality: what counts is the ability of the law to achieve the reforms 
requested by the policy officers. And, in view of the myriad of parameters that are unique in 
each dossier, there are no precise elements of quality at this level. If anything, this qualitative 
definition of quality in legislation as synonymous to effectiveness respects and embraces the 
subjectivity and flexibility of both drafting rules and conventions and, ultimately, of 
phronetic legislative drafting. 
But does the qualitative functional approach to the definition of quality in legislation 
signify that everything goes? The answer is of course negative: legislative drafting is 
phronetic, it is not art. In phronetic legislative drafting one must be able to identify basic 
principles which, as a rule, can render a law good. Cost efficiency, clarity, precision, and 
unambiguity are such principles: when applied, at least in the majority of cases, they lead to 
good laws. But, at the end of the day, each dossier carries subjective choices for the drafter, 
choices made on the basis of the ultimate functional test: effectiveness. What makes a law a 
good law therefore is the ability of the drafter to use the criterion of effectiveness consciously 
and correctly. What is correct application of the effectiveness criterion is a matter of debate 
and deliberation within the drafting team: after all, even drafters are human. Perhaps this is 
the beauty of a drafter’s trade: there are no safety nets, no walls to hide one’s nudity before 
the cruel sword of the end result.    
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Is quality universal? 
But, if one defines quality as effectiveness, does one subject quality as a concept to a fate of isolated 
subjectivity, relativity, and ultimately national eccentricity? Does a functional approach to quality tie 
it down to a national context [a national legal system, a national legislative environment, and a 
national regulatory agenda]? Does it deprive quality from transferability? And, ultimately, from 
universality? 
 The universality of quality in legislation is linked to the universality of legal rules. If one 
follows the view that legal systems, despite their national eccentricities, can learn from each other33, 
then the question here is not if quality is transferrable but how. Watson34 claims that legal rules are 
equally at home in many places, irrespective of their historical origins and connection to any 
particular people, any particular period of time or any particular place.35 Others qualify 
Watson’s anarchic borrowing from anyone and anywhere with the qualifier that like must be 
compared with like,36 namely with countries in the same evolutionary stage.37 Others allow 
transferability on the basis of differences, as only differences enhance our understanding of 
law in a given society.38  
Jhering, Zweigert and Kötz39 view the question of comparability through the relative 
prism of functionality.40 For them transferability is not a matter of nationality, but of 
usefulness and need.41 It is precisely this notion of functionality that supports transferability 
on the basis of effectiveness.
42
 The objective of a good law is to effectuate adequate reform 
along the lies requested by the government of the day. If the reform requested applies to more 
than one jurisdiction, then the notion of effectiveness breaks the geographical boundaries of a 
single jurisdiction. And transferability is not only possible, but also desirable. In the current 
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era of integrative legal globalisation43 transnational problems require urgent transnational 
solutions. Nowadays integrative transnational approaches seem to be no longer a luxury but a 
realistic response. Trade in human organs, organised crime, terrorism, paedophilia cross 
national borders and therefore require a-national solutions. Borrowing laws already applied 
elsewhere simply offers the drafting team the opportunity to propose and apply policy and 
legislative responses with unprecedented insight to the possible results to be produced. 
 The pyramid of virtues pursued by the drafter promotes effectiveness as the common highest 
pursuit for drafters, while allowing them to select the most appropriate tools within the constitutional, 
political, legal, and cultural constraints of the specific society at the specific time. Thus, the 
qualitative functional definition of quality reflects the integrative nature of our era of globalisation, 
while emphasising the need for naturalisation of legislative concepts. As a result, it promotes true 
universality rather than superficial standardisation. Diversity in drafting does not signify drafting 
nationalism. It is simply a reflection of the inherent subjective prioritisation of drafting virtues within 
the same hierarchical step to the ladder, based solely on national eccentricities, rather than an alleged 
rigid and rigid civil versus common law divide. But if common versus civil law barriers are 
demolished, what is it that explains diversity of drafting styles and choices? 
If one views drafting as a series of subjective choices, what explains diversity of law as the 
product can only be diversity in the factors that influence these choices. The nature of the legal system 
is one, but only one of those influencing factors. But what shines through diversity is universality, 
 In the concept of quality of legislation; 
 In the virtues that contribute to quality; and 
 In their hierarchical classification. 
After all, in the sphere of Aristotelian phronesis virtues are moral universals that are indeterminate. 
Thus phronetic drafting involves the virtue of effectiveness as a moral universal. Effectiveness as a 
virtue is indeterminate. But, like all phronesis, drafting includes a mental-moral habit which, by 
mediating universals in the particular case, makes them determinate.
44
 Thus, effectiveness as quality 
in legislation is universal and as such indeterminate. In order to attribute to it specific elements one 
needs to place it within the context of legal system, culture, legislative environment, and policy.    
Conclusions 
The aim of all drafters and law makers, irrespective of their legal tradition of origin, is ultimately the 
production of legislative texts that are capable of producing the desired regulatory results, as these are 
dictated by the policy makers of the government. The universality of this approach can be applied to 
produce a functional definition of quality of legislation: quality of laws signifies ability to produce the 
regulatory reforms required by the policy makers. Quality is effectiveness. Effectiveness may lead to 
efficacy if all actors in the policy and legislative processes cooperate harmoniously, and thus the 
regulatory reform actually does take place. But a drafter alone cannot achieve, nor indeed aspire to, 
efficacy.   
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Quality as effectiveness is a qualitative concept. There are no concrete parameters and rules 
that will always lead to effectiveness with persistence and infallibility. This is because the legal, 
political, social, and financial parameters which form the legislative environment are so varied, that 
duplication or reproduction of the exact same environment is simply impossible. But legislative 
drafting is not anarchic. Drafting is not an art. It is not a science either. And so rules of drafting are to 
be perceived as virtues to which a drafter can aspire, and which can result to effectiveness, if and 
when the drafter’s subjective choice to apply them in the current legislative circumstances is indeed 
appropriate.  
Drafting is phronesis. Drafting entails the application of drafting rules and conventions where 
appropriate. Appropriateness is proven via tests of application of the law against results produced: this 
is where post legislative scrutiny comes into play. 
Is quality of legislation an achievable concept? Effectiveness is achievable. Where the 
drafter’s subjective choices take place appropriately and within an appropriate legislative 
environment, the law can produce the required results and reforms. Is quality a universal pursuit? 
Well, if one uses the qualitative and functional definition of quality, yes, quality is universal. Drafters 
seek to produce reforms: legislation is a tool for regulation. This approach prevails both in the civil 
and the common law worlds. And clarity, precision, and unambiguity are virtues to which drafters 
aspire universally. Of course, the prioritisation of clashing or intertwined virtues when drafting 
legislation differs on the basis of national intricacies and eccentricities, one of which is the family of 
law within which the drafter drafts. But, this type of prioritisation is simply one more variable within 
which the drafter makes choices, within which the drafter applies their phronesis.  
Drafting is phronetic. Effectiveness is the ultimate pursuit, and the ultimate criterion of 
quality. Quality is effectiveness. And quality is a universal concept. And it is by no means utopian. 
